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Travelers using transit systems in cities such as London, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, New Delhi, Athens, or Beijing will be familiar with the phrase 
“Mind the Gap”—a warning about spaces where moving vehicles and fixed 
platforms leave holes to trap the unwary.  In this brief space, I will point 
out two scholarly gaps in the Association for the Rhetoric of Science and 
Technology (ARST) research corpus and suggest a way in which attending 
to each may illuminate the other.  The first and probably most 
contentious gap I allege is a lack of sufficient collective reflectiveness 
about our purposes in studying “rhetorics of science and technology” (my 
focus is especially in public discourse venues, although similar problems 
arise in the broader range of rhetoric of science and technology [RST] 
work).  The second gap I will point to is the Euro-American-centrism of 
most work done in this community. The relatively few published studies 
with an international focus indicate that great promise lies in expanding 
the RST repertoire in that direction, and I see some evidence that doing 
so may also aid those who wish to become more sophisticated about the 
purposes for RST work.  In addition, the globalization of science along 
with everything else suggests that it is well past time to do much more of 
that kind of hard work.   
Stumbling into the Gap(s) 
In 2012, John Lynch and I conducted a review of studies published in 
academic journals between 1994 and 2012 that focused on the rhetorics of 
science and technology as they appear in public discourse.  We argued 
(Condit & Lynch, 2012) that scholars had appeared to pursue four 
purposes in their work.  The present argument is based on that taxonomy, 
but I’m solely responsible for this extension.  The least common category 
we found, and probably the least controversial given the goals of academe, 
was constituted by essays dedicated to theory-building (e.g., 
Constantinides, 2001; Keränen, 2005; Lynch, 2009; McClure, 2009; 
Tillery, 2003). The other three purposes were potentially in conflict with 
each other to various degrees, and the tensions should be attended to, 
given the larger movements in the socio-political world, as well as given 
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the high profile arguments currently being made about the relationships 
among the humanities, social sciences, and biological sciences.   
The most common purpose we identified in this set of essays was to 
challenge specific representations associated with science.  Such studies 
generally identified biases or showed how science as represented in the 
public realm served oppressive interests, but they exhibited a range of 
scope with regard to the level at which their criticism was directed.  Some 
of these essays appear to take a stance of radical opposition to science per 
se (Bass, 1998; Happe, 2006a,b; Johnson, 2004, 2006, 2008; Mechling & 
Mechling, 1995; Scott, 2002) and others might be read merely as 
knocking some of the stuffing out of science’s self-appraisal (Lessl, 1999), 
while others seem more narrowly focused, directed to errors in a 
particular set of scientific assertions, but not articulating a broader 
condemnation of science per se (Koerber et al., 2008).  The former end of 
the spectrum might be labeled “science bad” studies and the latter “bad 
science” studies.   
A second highly common purpose consisted of explorations of the 
relative influence of science on public policies (hereafter “the power of 
science” studies).  Although most such studies assumed science was too 
powerful and were directed at increasing the role of the public in science 
policy and related realms, there was again some range in the relationship 
they projected between the rhetorical critic and science.  Some were quite 
antagonistic (i.e. “science too powerful”; e.g., Bennett, 2008; Endres, 
2009), others were apparently more melioristic (Evans et al., 2009), and 
still others seemed to suggest that science was already at least partially a 
subject of, rather than a powerful lord over, public discourse (Jordan, 
2004, 2009; Ratto, 2006).   
The oppositional stance of the “science bad” and “science too powerful” 
studies seems to be at odds with a third, relatively uncommon but 
apparently growing set of studies, the “Isocratean” studies that offered to 
improve scientific rhetorics (e.g., Ceccarelli, 2011; Jensen, 2007; Park, 
2001; Spoel et al., 2009; Väliverronen and Hellsten, 2002).  Instead of 
assuming that science was inherently or at least seriously flawed in its 
assumptions or conclusions, or that science was too powerful in the force 
it exerted in public, these essays assumed that scientists needed a little bit 
of help conveying their message to the public, and by implication that the 
world would be better with a little more scientific influence (at least of 
some kinds) rather than less.   
In all of these categories, most of the essays took for granted the 
validity of the purpose of their study, rather than reflecting upon it.  In 
the related and overlapping fields of “STS” (Science and Technology 
Studies), there has been some intense debate over purpose, but that 
debate is not evident in rhetorical studies.  Perhaps our far-flung and 
thinly staffed academic interest area survives best by papering over such 
fundamental differences in the purposes of our shared work.  If we agree 
to disagree about just why we are doing what we are doing, we have a 
bigger tent.  But I’m no longer comfortable with this pseudo-harmony, 
because of broader forces I will sketch shortly.  So, at the risk of stirring 
up unproductive acrimony, I think we should attend to this question. 
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The Enemy Is Digging the Gap to Undermine Us 
I pick this moment to raise this question because I believe that there is a 
newly powerful array of social forces and alliances to which any astute 
rhetorician should attend.  These forces seek to destroy the ability of any 
of us to do what we see as constructive academic work.  In the face of that 
threat, there is a “better for now” stance for scholars in the rhetoric of 
science and technology to take.  Whether you agree with my idea of what 
is “better for now” or not, I suggest you ought to attend to those forces in 
some way. 
The enemy on the horizon is not science, but what I have elsewhere 
called political regressives and will now just call the warlord cast.  Yes, 
“warlord” seems a bit over-the-top rhetorically, but it is a succinct 
shorthand for what is at stake.  Political regressives are arguing to 
eviscerate what we have come to know as the large-scale state in order to 
expand their personal power.  They’re actually shockingly overt about 
those goals, referring casually to their desire to build “dynasties.”   They, 
like every feudal lord in history, recognize that a liberal democratic state 
limits their own power.  These individuals are not aligned with “science”—
though they may use science as a strategic tool, just as they sometimes 
use religion, rhetoric, and the fine arts as strategic tools (think Koch’s 
devotion to ballet!).  To achieve their dynastic ambitions, the destruction 
of public universities and the control of private universities is 
appropriately high on their targeting lists.  While they are willing to 
selectively deploy the products of the university for their personal power, 
they are not willing to countenance centers of innovation that are not 
tightly under their power (it’s okay to have business schools and 
pharmaceutical labs, but not evolution or sociology!). 
Maintaining a university life-world that has its own integrity seems 
crucial to resisting these forces. And indeed, the existence of something 
like universities as special networked communities played a substantial 
role in overcoming the original version of Western feudalism.  Such a 
perspective urges one to see the humanities, the natural sciences, and the 
social sciences not as supra-disciplinary competitors, but as mutual 
contributors to a cosmopolitan and globalizing perspective that continues 
to work against concentrations of lordly power.  The tendencies of these 
three supra-disciplines, each in their own way, to expand the breadth of 
vision, self control, and empathy of young people have been productive 
contributors to the decline in violence, torture, ethnocentrism, rape, 
domestic abuse, and child abuse that, according to Steven Pinker’s (2011) 
nuanced documentation, occurred between 1400 and 2000.  Further 
progress is desirable and urgent, and in contrast to what Pinker suggests, 
further progress may require additional approaches.  But we should not 
spend all our time looking for additional approaches while the enemy of 
the approaches that have worked to a notable degree destroys our 
capacity to explore at all in an academic mode.  That is, the oppositional 
emotions of rhetoricians should not currently be directed primarily at 
scientists. 
This assertion (or call to re-orientation) depends on what Bruce 
Railsback and I have called (in reply to E.O. Wilson) a transilient 
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perspective (Condit & Railsback, 2005).  The transilient perspective 
notices both continuities and discontinuities among the humanities, 
natural sciences, and social sciences, and calls for an appreciation of both 
of those dimensions.  As a rhetorician examining science, I have been 
maintaining for quite some time that scientists cannot achieve what they 
claim to want to achieve—maximally inter-subjective, trans-situational 
descriptions—unless they are also self-reflective about the role of 
language in their endeavors.  Rhetorical reflection should therefore be 
part of the scientific method (or rather, part of the supra-methodology of 
expanding understanding).  But equally, I have become discouraged with 
my rhetorical colleagues who time and again portray science as an evil 
enemy, rule out the use of social scientific research in rhetorical essays, or 
refuse to be held accountable for the impressive and important bodies of 
evidence that natural and social scientists have amassed.  I am not 
suggesting that we should stop doing “bad science” studies, or contesting 
places where science exercises lop-sided influence, but I am suggesting 
that the predominance of “science bad” studies is ill-considered and 
probably disadvantageous to our own interests, as well as those of 
humanity more generally. 
To be an academic should not mean to find the narrowest possible 
community to credit or gain accreditation with.  It should be to accept the 
mission of enhancing understanding, where understanding engages 
maximal possible breadth under the—necessarily and desirably vague—
trajectory of improving the richness of life for human beings while 
protecting the natural world around us.  Scientists cannot expand 
understanding in this way without the humanities, social scientists cannot 
do this without the humanities, and humanists (or post-humanists) like 
rhetoricians also can’t do this without the natural and social scientists.  
Perhaps the warlords want to set the clock back to the pre-scientific era, 
but I am willing to argue—at as much length as necessary—that anyone 
who is not focused on their own status drives cannot read the available 
evidence and maintain that the world would be better if all the scientists 
walked out of their laboratories and turned into rhetorical critics 
overnight.   
An Academic Route: Internationalization  
I’ve offered a potentially divisive polemic.  But rather than leaving it there, 
with only the alternative of engaging each other on a polemical basis, I 
want to offer a respectable academic route for achieving the self-
reflectiveness about purposes that underlies my concern.  I ran across this 
possibility while doing the survey with Lynch. In reading the dozens of 
studies we examined for our review, I was struck by how the few studies 
that took an international bent tended to be forced out of the too-easy 
stances of “science bad” or “science too powerful.”   
One fine example is Paroske’s (2009) study of the rhetoric involved in 
the perspective that HIV does not cause AIDS as forwarded by former 
South African President Thabo Mbeki.  Using both close textual analysis 
and attention to the multiplicity of contexts, Paroske’s essay argues that 
Mbeki’s early rhetoric can be understood as arising from the historical 
context of previous Western imperialism, but that it initially aligned with 
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the view of science as an activity that involves the full and fair 
consideration of evidence as the basis for making claims.  However, 
Paroske suggests that as time passed Mbeki’s rhetoric changed, becoming 
something more akin to simple strategies for individual power 
maintenance.  That summary does not do justice to the nuances of 
Paroske’s argument, but I hope it shows how that analysis avoids the 
always-present trap for rhetoric of science studies—the temptation to 
offer a totalizing judgment that condemns and therefore urges the 
audience to reject an opponent (science) rather than to understand a 
rhetoric (and therefore to learn from it in a diversity of ways).   
I suggest that the work by Xiao (1995, 2004) similarly provides novel 
insight, as it examines how Darwinist discourse was taken up in China, 
with its long-standing and distinctive cultural assumptions.  Xiao’s 
studies make clear that one cannot presume a singular model of science-
society interaction, or even a singularity to a given scientific “theory.”   
As valuable as these internationally focused studies are, there are 
precious few of them.  And this paucity is particularly fascinating because 
many of the science controversies that scholars have studied have global 
reach.  Thus, there are several studies of global warming (Besel, 2011; 
Foust & Murphy, 2009; Moore, 2009; Spoel et al., 2009), but they tend 
not to engage the issue of the ways in which the associated rhetorics (pro, 
con, other) play out in non-Western contexts. An occasional mention of 
the different interests of industrialized and industrializing countries does 
not provide the richness of analysis and understanding that would seem 
to be available if one actually attended to the way in which “climate 
change” was discussed in the various regions of the globe.  In the absence 
of self-awareness about globalization, there seems to be a universalization 
of U.S., or at best, “Western” rhetorics.   
This internationalism-blind approach may have been encouraged by 
the tendency of early “rhetoric of science” studies to focus on a narrow 
“scientific” audience that could be presumed to be European (and 
eventually Euro-American).  While that approach can be defended in 
terms of the original contexts of the research, Xiao’s work has shown that 
even the “scientific” audience is not homogeneous as science has traveled 
the globe.  In the face of that example, those who wish to maintain that 
science is universal now must do the research to demonstrate their claim, 
rather than merely postulating such universalism.  Moreover, the 
interfaces between scientific communities and public policy seem even 
more likely to vary when cultural assumptions and governing structures 
are different. For example, Darwinism may play differently in public life 
not only in China, but also in India, where the role of science in society 
might be described as elegantly opportunist, perhaps as fostered by 
religions that do not demand univocality in public life.   
Genetics has recently provided a major area of focus for science 
studies, and the tensions are evident here as well.  The overwhelming 
majority of the articles Lynch and I located that discussed public scientific 
rhetorics about genetics took the national or global context for granted, 
and these contexts were Euro-American.  One probably should call this 
“pseudo-universalization.”  I am not criticizing others here, but calling all 
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of us to different orientations, for my own work, and that of my students, 
has attended almost exclusively to the U.S. (Condit, 2009; Gronnvoll & 
Landau, 2010).  My call to internationalization has been energized by 
what I have heard in attendance at international conferences, where 
people other than rhetoricians speak. The lively European work 
comparing public opinions about genetics, or the structuration of genetic 
establishments in different European countries, gives one a whiff of the 
possibilities.  But a stark presentation by a scholar who had studied the 
role of genetics in Mexico and Columbia made it evident to me that we 
have an enormous amount to learn about how rhetorics about genetics 
can be deployed (Schwartz Marin, 2012).  What happens when genetics is 
deployed in relationship to nationalistically developing cultures who 
codify mestizo identities?  Or within a small, isolated, rural community 
where Huntington’s chorea is common? Or where a developing nation 
sees the possibility that its native population’s DNA might be one 
resource for moving the nation to the global stage?  
It is not merely that we know too little because we only know our own 
context.  It is also that we might be encouraged to be something like 
rhetorical determinists about science, settling too quickly for a narrow 
range of stories about how science and rhetoric must go or should go.  In 
other words, the stories we tell may be wrong in important ways, because 
they mistake a fragment for a broader terrain.  Because the rhetorics of 
science have power in the world, and because Euro-America is not the 
sole influence on the world—not even the sole source of science in the 
world—expanding our stories seems requisite if we believe that our story 
telling matters as understanding.   
The ethnocentric focus of ARST scholars to this point has been quite 
understandable—we are a very small group of scholars, with pitiable 
resources compared to many academic areas.  The task of addressing 
globalized rhetorics is extremely difficult; it demands multi-linguistic 
competence, international partnerships, expensive fieldwork, and widely 
open minds joined with careful, dogged, systematic efforts.  All of this, 
however, may be just what we need to break up our too-comfortable 
assumptions about what “our” relationship to “science” should be, and to 
cause us to reflect on “our” purposes in doing academic work about 
science and technology. 
The bright glimmers of existing internationalized work provide an 
important warning and promise.  Mind the gaps!   
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